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Abstract: What can one infer about labor market °ows from matched
employer-employee panel data? The purpose of this paper is to sketch possible
answers to this question. A general but simple labor market equilibrium model
of hire and separation °ows is developed in the paper. The model embodies the
hypothesis that worker productivity di®ers across employers and that worker
and employer °ows re°ect responses to these di®erences in a labor market char-
acterized by friction. In the modeled market, each agent acts optimally taking
as given the wage o®er distribution and market tightness and these in turn are
determined by their collective action. The existence of a labor market equilib-
rium is established under two di®erent wage determination models: rent sharing
and wage posting. A demonstration that market °ow parameters, search and re-
cruiting e®ort functions, and the equilibrium wage distribution can be estimated
with matched job-work °ow data is the principal contribution of the paper.
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11 Introduction
What can one infer about the role of job and worker °ows from panel data on the
labor force dynamics of individual establishments matched to worker identi¯ers?
Preliminary answers to this question are raised in this paper. Essentially the
idea proposed here is to use a synthesis of the theoretical constructs found in the
recent literature on the `°ows approach' to equilibrium labor market analysis as
developed in Pissarides (1990), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Bertola and
Caballero (1994), Burdett and Mortensen (1998), and Bontemps et al. (1998)
as a tool for analyzing the recently available matched employer-worker panel
data described by Abowd and Kramerz (1999).
A simple framework for the analysis of the relationships between hire, lay-
o®, and quit °ows and their determinants designed to explain the evolution of
establishment size is presented in the paper and set within a synthesis of the
search and matching equilibrium frameworks. Following the argument of Idson
and Oi (1999), the explanation for labor force size di®erences studied in the
paper is heterogeneity in employer productivity. Heterogeneity of this form is
also needed to understand the behavior of job °ows as documented by Davis,
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). An implied positive correlation between the
wage paid and plant size for both a bilateral bargaining rent sharing model of
wage determination as assumed by Pissarides (1990) and a dynamic monopsony
model in which each employer posts a wage o®er as in Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) is an implication of the hypothesis.1 Within the framework studied,
more productive establishments hire at greater rates, pay better, experience
lower turnover rates, and, as a consequence, grow to a larger size in both cases.
The behavioral relationships of the model, appropriately aggregated, deter-
mine the distributions of wage o®ers as well as market tightness and the level
of employment under either wage determination hypothesis. But, market tight-
ness, unemployment, and the wage o®er distribution provide the information
that agents use to make search and recruiting decisions. A proof that a ratio-
nal expectations market equilibrium exists for both the rent sharing and wage
posting models of wage determination is the principal theoretical result of the
paper. A demonstration that the equilibrium behavior relationships and aggre-
gates can be estimated using matched available matched job-worker °ow data is
the more original and interesting contribution. In sum, the goal of the paper is
the development of a theoretical market equilibrium approach for the empirical
analysis of matched employer-employee data.
In section 2, a dynamic theory of an establishment's labor force size is created
by merging the theory of optimal worker search e®ort with the theory of vacancy
creation. The result is a characterization of establishment labor force size, n;
as a simple `birth-death' Markov process characterized by a hiring frequency,
1The existence of the relationship is documented by Brown and Medo® (1989) for the US.
Bontemps et al. (1998) and Abowd et al. (1999) demonstrate that the relationship exists
in France, Blanch°ower et al. (1996) provides evidence for the relationship in England, and
Albraek (1998) and Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen (1996) show that plant size e®ects on
wages are of similar magnitude in Denmark.
2h; and separation rate, d. In the special case of constant marginal product per
worker both are independent of n and the invariant distribution for this process
is Poisson with mean equal to h=d: The expected frequencies with which a worker
receives o®ers and an employer receives job applicants as well as the distribution
of wage o®ers are regarded as given by each individual agent but are determined
by their collective activities. An equilibrium is a set of optimal agent actions
that generate the market °ow parameters and wage o®er distribution that all
the agents expect. Equilibrium is de¯ned and existence proofs are provided in
section 3 for both the rent sharing and wage posting cases. As noted above,
the model implies that an employer's labor force size is a known stochastic
process. A recursive maximum likelihood estimation strategy based on this fact
is devised in section 4 of the paper. Under the strategy, search and recruiting
levels for each employer type and the equilibrium distribution of wage o®ers are
identi¯ed.
2 Labor Force Dynamics
2.1 Search Strategy and Reservation Wage
Worker's choose acceptance and search strategies to maximize the expected
present value of their own future income stream. Let r ¸ 0 represent the
common discount rate and let F(w) represent the fraction of vacancies that
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where ¸s is the Poisson rate at which outside o®ers arrive given search intensity
s, cw(s) denotes the cost search e®ort, ± is the exogenous job destruction rate,
and U represents the value of unemployment. The relationship re°ects the fact
that the worker only quits when an outside o®er has a higher value than the
current job and the fact that worker's expected present value of future income
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where b represents income when unemployed. Given that the o®er distribution
has a bounded support, the existence and uniqueness of a increasing value func-
tion W(w) and an associated value of unemployment U is consequence of the
fact that both can be represented as ¯xed points of contraction maps. (See
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b).)
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3where w denotes the upper support of the wage o®er distribution. Consequently,
W0(w) =
1
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is the optimal choice of search e®ort.
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consistent with the boundary condition c0
w(s(w)) = 0: As an implication, s(w)
is decreasing and di®erentiable if F(w) is continuous.
When unemployed, the typical worker accepts an o®er only if it is no smaller
than the reservation wage. As the reservation wage equates the value of employ-
ment to the value of unemployed search, denoted by U; acceptance requires that
w ¸ R where the reservation wage, R; solves U = W(R): Given that a wage
o®er arrives at rate ¸s and that wage is a random draw from the distribution
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where b is the unemployment bene¯t forgone when employed and W(R) = U
is the de¯nition of the reservation wage. Hence, equations (1) and (3) imply
that the search intensity of an unemployed worker is the same as that of a
worker employed at the reservation wage provided that the reservation wage is
the unemployment bene¯t,
s0 = s(R) (4)
which in turn implies that the reservation wage is equal to the unemployment
bene¯t if the lowest wage o®ered is the unemployment bene¯t, i.e.,
R = b if w = b: (5)
42.2 Recruiting Strategy and Wage O®er
In this subsection, a theory of recruiting behavior along the lines developed by
Pissarides (1990) and Bertola and Caballero (1994) is used to derive an optimal
establishment hire °ow. Each employer recruits new workers by posting job
vacancies, a number denoted by v.2
Employers di®er in productive e±ciency. Let p represent the productivity
of a job-worker match and ¹(p) represent the measure of employers with pro-
ductivity equal to or less than p: All workers are perfect substitutes and all
have the same outside option to employment characterized by a common reser-
vation wage R = b as established above. For the moment, let the pair (p;w)
characterize and employer where w represents her wager o®er.
Let ´0s0 and ´1s(w) denote the frequencies with which unemployed work-
ers and employed worker respectively apply for a vacancy. As all workers are
identical, all wages o®ered in the market by participating employer must be ac-
ceptable to unemployed workers. However, because an employed worker accepts
only when o®ered a higher paying job, the rate at which a vacancy o®ering wage
w is matched with some worker is ´0s0+´1
R w
w s(z)dG(z) where G(w) represents
the fraction of workers earn w or less, i.e., the wage distribution. Each employer
posts the number of vacancies that maximizes the expected present value of the
¯rm's future cash °ow attributable to recruiting activity. Formally, the number










where J(p;w) denotes the expected present value of an employed worker given
the employer's productivity p and wage w and cf(v) is an increasing, twice
di®erentiable, and strictly convex cost of recruiting function.
Because an employed worker quits when a higher outside o®er is located, the
employer's value of a continuing match solves the Bellman equation
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: (7)
After substitution for the value of a ¯lled job from (7), equation (6) implies that
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: (8)
2Vacancies here are better measured by an indicator of recruiting e®ort rather than a count
of job openings; e.g., the volume of want ads will do.
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: (9)
In a labor market characterized by friction, the wage rate o®ered by any em-
ployer is essentially indeterminate.3 Following Pissarides (1990) among others,
one might suppose that the wage is the outcome of a simple bilateral bargaining
problem. For example, suppose that when an unemployed worker and employer
meet, the worker makes a wage demand with probability ¯ and the employer
accepts or rejects. Conversely, the employer sets the wage with complementary
probability 1 ¡ ¯ and the worker accepts or rejects. If negotiation ends after
the ¯rst round, the expected outcome yields the simple linear rent sharing rule
w(p) = ¯p +(1 ¡ ¯)R (10)
because each agent will demand all the rent when he or she has the power
to set the wage. Note that the recruiting e®ort under the rent sharing wage
rule v(p;w(p)); increases with employer productivity p from (9) given that the
employer's expected share of match rent ¯ is a fraction.
Instead of sharing the rent, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) assume that
employers post the wage they pay all employees once and for all and that each
worker only have the power to accept or reject. Because the employer sets the
wage as well as vacancies to maximize pro¯t from recruiting activities as de¯ned












Because the ¯rst term, the product of the acceptance probability divided by the
rate at which match rent is discounted, is increasing in the wage o®er, the wage
rule is well de¯ned. Be implication, recruiting e®ort v(p;w(p)) also increases
with employer productivity from equation (9) and the envelope theorem under
wage posting.
Finally, it is useful to note that the productivity of the marginal employer,
the smallest wage o®ered and the reservation wage all equal the unemployment
bene¯t b under either wage setting rule if employers exist with productivity
slightly higher than the bene¯t. Formally,
w = p = R = b if ¹(b + ") > 0 for all small " > 0: (12)
This result is implied by (8), (5), and the wage rule in each case. Namely,
because v(p;w) > (=) 0 as p > (=)w in both cases, v(p;w(p)) = 0 =) p =
w(p) = w = R = b under both the rent sharing rules, equation (10) and the
wage posting rule (11). The quali¯cation is needed in the rent sharing case
because p = p0 if ¹(p0) = 0 for some p0 > b and, therefore, w = w(p0) > R > b.
Although w = R = b always in the case of wage posting, the quali¯cation it is
still necessary for p = b:
3See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b) for a more extensive development of this point.
62.3 Labor Force Size
That employer productivity, wage and labor size are all positively correlated is
a well documented stylized fact. In this section we demonstrate that positive
associations between any two of these three variable is implied under either wage
determination hypothesis.
Because in any su±ciently small time interval either a worker is hired, one
separates or neither event occurs, labor force size is a special Markov chain on
the integers known as a birth-death process. Formally, an employer's labor force
size fn(t)g evolves as a stochastic process characterized by the `birth' frequency




and a `death' rate per employed worker
d(w) = ± + ¸s(w)[1 ¡F(w)]: (14)
It is well known the distribution of the future value of n(t) converges to a Poisson
with mean
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: (15)
at t ! 1 for any initial values (See, Feller (1968)). Because the acceptance
probability increases with w, the quit rate decreases with w; and recruiting
e®ort v(p;w(p)) increase with p under either wage determination hypothesis
imply that the labor force size n(w) increases with both productivity p and the
wage w(p). Of course, the positive association is induced by the fact that more
productive employers both pay a higher wage and employ more workers in the
long run.
For future reference, it useful to derive the laws of motion for the probability
that the labor force size will take on any particular integer value in the future.
The argument is based on the fact that either a worker is hired, a worker sep-
arates, or neither happens in any su±ciently short period of time. Any other
change in size would involve some combination of independent hire and separa-
tion events, the probability of which vanishes relative to the length of the period
as the period length itself converges to zero.
Indeed, the probability of a transition from a labor force size n¡1 to one of
n in any su±ciently short time interval of length ¢ is approximate equal to h¢;
the probability of transition from size n + 1 to n is approximately d(n + 1)¢
and the probability of making a transition from any other labor force size to n
is of order ¢2 or higher. Hence, the probability that the labor force is of size
n at date t +¢; denoted as pn(t+¢) conditional on the distribution over n at
time t satis¯es
pn(t + ¢) = pn¡1(t)h¢ + pn+1(t)d(n + 1)¢
+[1 ¡h¢ ¡ dn¢]pn(t) + o(¢)
7for all n ¸ 1 and
p0(t +¢) = p1(t)d¢ +[1 ¡h¢]p0(t) + o(¢)
where o(¢)=¢ ! 0 as ¢ ! 0: In continuous time the distribution evolves
according to the laws of motion
_ pn = lim
¢!0
½
pn(t + ¢) ¡pn(t)
¢
¾
= hpn¡1 + (n + 1)dpn+1 ¡ (h +nd)pn (16)
for n ¸ 1 and
_ p0 = dp1 ¡hp0: (17)
The invariant distribution is the steady state solution to these di®erential






















































the invariant distribution of labor force size given hiring and separation rates is









3 Labor Market Equilibrium
3.1 The Matching Process
The various meeting rate parameters, ¸; ´0 and ´1; are interrelated through the
process by which workers and job vacancies meet. Suppose that this process can
8be represented by a matching function that transforms matching inputs, search
and recruiting e®ort, into an aggregate meeting °ow. We made two assumptions
that simplify the analysis that follows: (1) The search e®ort of unemployed and
employed workers are perfect substitutes for one another. (2) The matching
function exhibits constant returns. Both of these assumptions are standard in
the search and matching equilibrium literature. (See Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999a,1999b).)






represents the aggregate number of vacancies posted,




Under the usual assumption of random matching at rates proportional to own




















































3.2 Steady State Unemployment and Wage Distribution
Because all o®ers are acceptable to an unemployed worker, the unemployment






















9given the search e®ort and vacancy function. Because m(µ) is increasing and
concave, the left side is monotone increasing in µ and is zero if and only if
µ = 0: Hence, there is a unique solution for µ given any search e®ort and
vacancy function pair (s(w);v(p;w)).
As the steady state measure of workers earning w or less, G(w); balances the
°ow of workers into and out of the category, the steady state wage distribution
function solves







where the left side accounts for the fraction of employment is the category who
are laid o® plus the fraction who quit to take higher paying jobs and the right
side is the °ow into the category from unemployment expressed as a fraction of
employment. Finally, the wage o®er distribution, the fraction of vacancies that
o®er wage w or less, is induced by the vacancy function v(p;w) and the measure
of ¯rms that pay wage w(p) or less: Indeed,
F(w(p)) =
R w(p)
w v(e p;w(e p))d¹(e p)
R w
w v(e p;w(e p))d¹(e p)
: (25)
De¯nition 1 Given a vacancy function v(p); and a search intensity function
s(w); the associated labor market steady state is the tightness parameter µ; o®er
distribution F(w); and wage distribution G(w) de¯ned by equations (23), (24),
and (25).
3.3 Existence
In a steady state equilibrium, each worker searches and each employer recruits
at optimal rates taking as given the labor market steady state induced by their
collective actions.
De¯nition 2 A steady state rent sharing equilibrium is a pair of functions
(s(w);v(p)) and the associated labor market steady state that satisfy the op-
timality conditions, equations (2) and (8), given that the wage is determined by
the linear rent sharing rule (9).
If search and recruiting e®ort are both essential inputs in the matching
process, i.e., M(0;S) = M(V;0) = 0 for all S and V; then a trivial no-trade
equilibrium always exists. Since the application rate per vacancy is ´0 + ´1 =
M(V;0)=V = 0 when no workers search and because the o®er arrival rate per
unit of search e®ort is ¸ = M(0;S)=S = 0 when no employer recruits, no trade
in the sense that V = S = 0 is an equilibrium because every individual agent
on either side of the market has no incentive to make the e®ort to ¯nd a match.
Below we demonstrate that a non-trivial equilibrium also exists if a little search
e®ort is costless. For technical reason, we also need to assume an uniform upper
bound on vacancies.
10Assumption 1 The cost of search cw(s) is strictly increasing, strictly convex,
and twice di®erentiable on [s;1) for some arbitrarily small number s > 0
and cw(s) = c0
w(s) = 0 for all s 2 [0;s]:
Assumption 2 The cost of recruiting cf(v) is strictly increasing, strictly con-
vex, and twice di®erentiable on [0;v] for some arbitrarily large number
v < 1, cf(0) = c0
f(0) = 0 and cf(v) = 1 for v > v:
The argument for the existence of an equilibrium is based on the fact that the
equilibrium conditions de¯ne a mapping, T; from the space of real valued vector
function pairs f(w) = (s(w);v(w)) de¯ned on the compact interval [R;w], call
it z; to itself where R = b under the assumption that there are potential entrant
who would pay less than the reservation wage, i.e., ¹(b) > 0. By construction,
any ¯xed point of the map is an equilibrium. To derive T, note that for any
f 2 z the steady state labor market equations (23) - (25) uniquely determine a
vector (µ;F) 2 <+ £ ¢; where ¢ is the space of distribution functions. Let T1
denote this transformation. The optimality conditions, equations (2) and (8),
generate a unique f 2 z for any choice of (µ;F) 2 <+£¢. Let T2 represent this
map. To sum up then, a transformation T : z ! z exists, where Tf = T1T2f
and any ¯xed point f = Tf is a rent sharing equilibrium.
In the case of a measure of employers o®ering wage w or less, ¹(w), which
is continuous, z is a subset of the space of continuous bounded real valued
function pairs de¯ned on [R;w]; with the sup norm, under Assumptions 1 and
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(26)
for any µ. If ¹(w) is continuous then F(w) is also continuous given any con-
tinuous function v : [R;w] ! <+ from equation (24). Hence, the solution s(w)
to the equation above is a continuous map from the interval [R;w] to [s;s(R)]:
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where µ is a uniform upper bound on possible equilibrium values of market
tightness implied by Assumptions 1 and 2 and derived below. Of course, the
¯rst inequality is implied by the fact that µ · µ and that m(µ) is increasing and
the second by the fact that F(w) 2 [0;1], s(w) ¸ 0. In sum, s(w) is a continuous
bounded decreasing function if a uniform upper bound on market tightness µ
exists.
We proceed to show that a bound on market tightness exists under Assump-
tions 1 and 2. First, note that the market equations of (21) imply that the ¯rst
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¸
by equation (8). The solution is unique, continuous and increasing in p and
v(R) = 0 for any continuous distribution function F(w), a condition already
established. Of course, for su±ciently small values of µ, v(p) is at the corner v
speci¯ed in Assumption 2.
Given that (26) and Assumption 1 imply that s(w) is uniformly bounded






represents a uniform upper bound on µ by equation (22) given any f 2 z.
Consequently, we have completed the demonstration that T : z ! z where z
is a subset of the space of continuous bounded real valued function pairs de¯ned
on [R;w]:
Theorem 3 If the measure of employers of productivity p or less, ¹(p); is con-
tinuous and ¹(b) > 0, if the di®erence between the upper support of the pro-
ductivity distribution, x, and the unemployment bene¯t, b; is positive and ¯nite,
and if the o®er arrival rate per unit of search e®ort, m(µ); is non-negative,
increasing, continuous and concave, then a non-trivial rent sharing equilibrium
exists under Assumptions 1 an 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.4 An Example
Pissarides' (1990) theory of equilibrium unemployment is a limiting example of
the general framework. Speci¯cally, his model corresponds to the case of only
one employer type and a constant posting cost per vacancy. It is well known
that a unique non-trivial equilibrium exists in this special case.
To characterize the equilibrium, ¯rst note that the lack of wage dispersion
implies no search while employed, i.e., s(w) = 0 for w > R from equation (26)
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s¸0




12from equation (1), equation (3), the de¯nition of the reservation wage U =
W(R); and equation (7) where p = p is the productivity common to all employer.









is the equivalent to the linear rent sharing rule de¯ned in equation (9).4
Equilibrium market tightnessisdetermined by equations (28) and (9), rewrit-











where a = c0
f(v) is the constant cost of posting a vacancy and the aggregate
number of vacancies posted by all employers is implied by µ = V=s0u from









from equation (9), the reservation wage can be expressed as
R = b ¡ cw(s0) + s0c0
w(s0):
A non-trivial equilibrium is any triple (µ;s0;R) that satis¯es these three





Given that m(µ) is increasing and concave, the ¯rst equation implies a nega-
tively sloped relation between R and µ which lies in the positive quadrant. As
s0c0
w(s0) ¡ c(s0) is non-negative and increasing in s0 under Assumption 1, the
second and third equation imply an increasing relationship between the R and
µ such that R = b when µ = 0: Consequently, a unique positive solution for
(µ;s0;R) exists if x ¡b ¸ 0.
3.5 Wage Posting Equilibrium
Instead of sharing the rent, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) assume that em-
ployers post the wage they pay all employees and that each worker only have
4However, this equivalence result holds only in the case of homogenous employers. In the
heterogenous case, workers employed at less than the highest wage o®ered will search while
employed. Because employed worker's don't account for the loss in rents su®ered by their
employer when a quit takes place, the Nash bargaining solution will be set to partially o®set
this external e®ect of search on the job.
13the power to accept or reject. Because the employer sets the wage as well as
vacancies to maximize pro¯t from recruiting activities as de¯ned in equation
(6), the linear rent sharing rule, equation (10), is replaced by the wage posting
rule, equation (11), which maximizes the employer's expected future discounted

























from equations (21) and (??).5 The fact that a higher wage increases the prob-
ability that an employed applicant will accept and decreases the rate at which
existing employees quit to take higher paying jobs, the employer has and exploits
dynamic monopsony power.
A labor market equilibrium with wage posting is de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 4 A steady state wage posting equilibrium is a function tuple (s(w);v(p);w(p))
and the associated labor market steady state that satisfy the optimality condi-
tions, equations (2), (8), and (31).
As demonstrated by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and by Bontemps et al.
(1998), w(p) is unique, strictly increasing, w = R; and R < w(p) < p when the
distribution of p is atomless just as in the linear rent sharing case.6 Furthermore,
the optimal vacancy choice, which solves c0
f(v(x)) = maxw¸0 f(p ¡ w)`(w)g; is
also increasing in p: Consequently, the number of vacancies posted by a ¯rm
o®ering wage w is also increasing. Because the wage posting wage rule and
vacancy policy satis¯es all the same qualitative properties as under rent sharing,
the existence of a non-trivial wage posting equilibrium follows by essentially the
same argument used above given a slightly stronger condition on the distribution
of productivity.
5Of course, `(w) is the product of the acceptance probablity and the present value of a unit
future stream of income discounted at a rate equal to the sum of the interest and separation
rates. However, in the case of r = 0; `(w) is equal to the expected long run size of the labor
force of an establishment that pays wage w by equation (15). This fact ties the model to that
studied in Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
6One di®erence is that the lowest wage is equal to the reservation wage, R; even if the
lower support of the distribution of employer productivity is larger. The reason is that the
employer paying the lowest wage hires no employed workers and loses all employees to higher
paying ¯rms. Hence, that employers has no incentive to pay more than the wage than all
unemployed workers ¯nd acceptable.
14Theorem 5 If the measure of employers who with productivity p or less, ¹(p);
is di®erentiable, if the di®erence between the upper support of the distribution,
p; and the unemployment bene¯t, R = b; is positive and ¯nite, and if the o®er
arrival rate per unit of search e®ort, m(µ); is non-negative, increasing, con-
tinuous and concave, then a non-trivial wage posting equilibrium exists under
Assumptions 1 and 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 Estimation
An estimation strategy that uses matched employer-employee data which in-
clude the size of an employer's labor force and employer speci¯c worker °ows
is sketched in this section. As an example, consider the Danish Integrated
Database for Labor Market Research (IDA) ¯le. It includes annual observa-
tions on the employment of all Danish establishments, employee identi¯ers, the
earning of each employee, and employee characteristics for all year 1980-1995.
(See Bingley et al. (1999).) These observations over a single year are su±cient
to identify the structure of the model constructed above.
Speci¯cally, non-parametric search and recruiting policy functions s(w) and
v(p) = v(p) together with the transition parameter vector (±;¸;´0;´1) can be
estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure for given o®er and wage distri-
bution functions F and G. For this purpose, it is natural to use non-parametric
estimates of the two distribution functions based on the wages received by all
workers hired during the year and wages earned by all workers employed at the
beginning, both of which are observable in the IDA data. Once these initial es-
timates are obtained, the associated wage and o®er distributions implied by the
aggregate labor market and steady state conditions, equations (22)-(25), can
be computed. Obviously, one can use these computed distribution functions
and the same maximum likelihood procedure to obtain second stage estimates
of the policy functions and transition parameters. If the sequence of estimates
obtained by continued iteration in this fashion converges, then the limiting esti-
mates incorporate all the structure implied by the model. A comparison of the
o®er and wage distributions actually observed with the ¯nal estimates provide
a goodness of ¯tness test. Furthermore, a cost of search function and a cost of
recruiting function can be inferred. The interactive procedure represents a com-
putationally simple way to compute the equilibrium wage and o®er distribution
while at the same time estimating the structure that underlies the distributions.
4.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimates








15where ni is the number of employees at the beginning of the year, ns
i is a count
of the \stayers," workers present in the ¯rm's labor force both at the beginning
and at the end of the year, nd
i is the number of workers present at the beginning
of the year who leave during the year, and nh
i is the number hired during the
year who reported in the employer's labor force at the year. Let wi represent
the average wage paid by the employer and let pi denote output per worker..
Under the assumption that workers are identical but are paid di®erent wages
across employing establishments, the model `explains' cross employer variation
in the triple (n0;ns;n;) by cross employer variation in w and p.7Let
Li(hi;di) = Prfn0 = n0
ijns = ns
i;n = nigPrfns = ns
ijn = nigPrfn = nig (35)
represent the contribution of the ith observation to the overall likelihood func-
tion.
As demonstrated above, an employer's establishment size is a stochastic
birth-death process de¯ned by the birth frequency hi and death rate di: The
invariant distribution of this continuous time ¯rst order Markov process on the
non-negative integers is the Poison with mean equal to hi=d. Hence, the size
distribution for establishment i is











Given the fact that a job spell with a particular employer is exponentially dis-
tributed with parameter equal to the separation rate d, the conditional proba-
bility that exactly ns of the original n workers stayed the entire year and the
remainder did not is distributed according to the binomial with parameter e¡d
Prfns = ns











Of course, nh = n0¡ns represent only measured hires, a lower bound on the
number actually hired during a year to the extent that some of those hired left
before the year ended Still, if the separation rate d were `small'
Prfn0 = n0
ijns = ns











since new hires arrive at the Poisson rate h over the unit interval. However, one
can use the model to improve on this approximation.
Assign the integers 1 to n0 ¡ ns to those hired and present at the end of
the interval and assign larger numbers to those who were hired and left. Let j
7To emperically implement this assumption, one needs to divide the sample into subsamples
of workers that are as homogenous as possible and who participate in separate labor markets.
In the case of the IDA, workers are identi¯ed by occupation categories, managers, o±ce
workers, skilled and unskilled workers, that approximate this requirement.
16denote this index. Then, any worker with index j · n0 ¡ ns must have been
hired at some unobserved instant t 2 [0;1] within the period and stayed for a
period of length [t;1] while any one with index j greater did not stay. Since the
instant hired in the interval is uniformly distributed, the probability of actually










































because we know that at least j ¸ n0 ¡ns were hired, those that were observed
at the ¯rm stayed, and those hired but not observed left. Finally, after some
tedious algebra, one obtains
Prfn0 = n0
ijns = ns











































where ¡(x;y) is the incomplete Gamma function, the CDF of the gamma ran-
dom variate.8
Conditional on non-parametric estimates of the wage and o®er distributions,
F and G, the hiring and separation rate are related to each employer's produc-
tivity and wage by





di = ± +¸s(wi)[1 ¡ F(wi)]:
For purpose of identi¯cation, the following normalizations are imposed.
s0 = s(R) = 1 = v(p;w) (40)
8This ¯nal step in the derivation is a contribution from George Neumann.
17Essentially, these assumptions determine the units in which search e®ort and
vacancies are measured. Finally, the ¯rst stage estimates solve
³








s.t. (39) and (40).
(41)
Call the parameter and policy function estimates obtained in this case by ap-
plying (41) the ¯rst stage estimates.
4.2 Distribution and Matching Cost Estimates
The equilibrium wage o®ered and wage earned distributions implied by the
¯rst stage estimates of the transition parameters and policy functions can be
constructed using equations (23)-(25): Speci¯cally, the equilibrium sample o®er





i2N b v (pi;wi)
(42)
where wi is the actual wage paid by employer i and pi is the same employer's
labor productivity. The associated steady state wage distribution is the unique
solution to
± b G(w) +¸[1 ¡ b F(w)]
Z w
R
b s(z)db G(w) = ± b F(w): (43)
Second stage estimates of the parameters and policy functions can be computed
by using these functions in the equations of (39) and then resolving the maxi-
mum likelihood estimation problem de¯ned by equation (41). The limit of the
sequence of estimates obtained by iterating between these two equations and
equations (42) and (43) satisfy all the structure imposed by the model. Finally,
these estimates can be compared with the actual distributions observed in the
data to determine the extent to which the model explains the wage and o®er
distributions.
That equations (42) and (43) are the o®er and wage distributions implied
by the model for both the rent sharing and wage posting hypotheses is worthy
of note. The reason for the independence is that both wage determination mod-
els have the same qualitative implications about the vacancy function, namely
that the number of vacancies posted increases with the wage paid. Given an
estimate of this function which is monotone, both the o®er distribution and the
steady state wage distribution implied by the model is the same under any wage
determination mechanism that implies that vacancies increase with the wage.
The fundamental assumption of the search equilibrium `°ow' approach to
labor market analysis is that frictions in the form of search and recruiting costs
are important. Accounting data simply cannot provide a test of this assump-
tion because accounting practice does not separate out these costs from general
18overhead. One advantage of the structural framework outlined here is that it
permits inference about the magnitude of these costs. Speci¯cally, the marginal
search cost function implied by the estimates,
c0
w(b s(wi)) = b ¸
Z w
wi
[1 ¡ b F(e w)]de w
r +b ± + b ¸b s(e w)[1 ¡ b F(e w)]
(44)
by equation (26), which is determined up to a speci¯cation of the discount rate
r. Because empirically the separation rate is much larger than any estimate
of the discount rate, even the upper bound on the marginal cost obtained by
setting r = 0 is a good approximation. Similarly, equation (28) implies that the
marginal cost of recruiting function estimate in the rent sharing case is
c0
f(b v(pi;wi)) =
[b ´0 +b ´1
R wi
w b s(z)db G(z)](pi ¡ wi)
r +b ± + b ¸b s(w)[1 ¡ b F(w)]
: (45)
Of course, in the rent sharing case, this estimate of recruiting cost is only iden-
ti¯ed up to a choices of the share parameter ¯ and reservation wage R = b:
5 Future Research
The model explored in this paper is a prototype for a more general framework
that might be useful for the structural interpretation and analysis of matched
employer-employee data. A more complex version is needed to confront the rich-
ness of the data actually available and the set of questions that are of interest.
Extending the empirical approach to the full panel of observations available
in most matched employer-employee data sets is an obvious next step. Time
variation in employer productivity will be a feature of these data that one can-
not ignore. How does one model this feature? Should the observed variations
be regarded as noise or as the realizations of a stochastic process with a law of
evolution known to the decision makers in the model? Of course, births and
deaths of employing establishments will also be observed. How does one ac-
knowledge these events in the model and in the estimation strategy? Although
the formal model is much more complicated when the employer productivity
parameter is treated as a process, it has the potential for providing insight into
the interpretation of job and worker °ow data, particularly those components
that are associated with the births and deaths of establishments.
Another generalization would explicitly account for within establishment
worker heterogeneity. In the case of the IDA, the usual demographic and ed-
ucation of each worker is known as well as occupation. The availability of the
data permit a joint theoretical and empirical study of labor force composition
e®ects. For example, the model can be modi¯ed to include an establishment
level production function that could be estimated using observed time series
variation in a given employers labor force composition as well as cross section
di®erences. The extent to which employee composition explains cross employer
productivity di®erences is also a question that one should be able to address
from a structural perspective.
196 Appendix: Existence Proofs
6.1 Rent Sharing Case
Proof. Under the hypothesis, the lowest wage o®ered and the least productive
employer's productivity both equal the reservation wage, i.e., w = p = R:
Hence, any ¯xed point of the map T : z ! z de¯ned in the text is a rent
sharing equilibrium when w(p) is the wage rule (9) where f = (s(w);v(p)) is
an element of z, a subset of continuous bounded real valued function pairs
de¯ned on the compact interval [R;w(p)]£[R;p]: Hence, Schauder's ¯xed point
theorem, as stated by Lucas and Stokey (1989, p. 520), implies existence if z is
non-empty, closed, bounded and convex, the operator T is continuous and the
family of functions T(z) is equicontinuous.
The vacancy function v(p) maps [R;p] into [0;v] and the search function s(w)
maps [R;w(p)] into [s;s] where s is speci¯ed in Assumption 1, v is speci¯ed in
Assumption 2, and s is uniquely determined by equations (27) and (29). As
¹(R) is increasing in R, s is monotone decreasing in R: Hence, for any ¯nite
w > R, 1 > s > s for all s > 0 chosen su±ciently small from equation (26).
Consequently, z is nonempty, closed, bounded and convex.
To show that T is continuous on z it is necessary and su±cient to prove
that both of its component operators, T1 and T2; are continuous. First, consider
T1 : z ! <+£¢ de¯ned by equations(23)-(25). Without belaboring the details,
continuity of the transformation is implied by that fact that the integration
operator on any continuous bounded real valued function is continuous in the
space of continuous bounded functions with the sup norm. The transformation
T2 : <+ £ ¢ ! z de¯ned by the integral equation (26) is continuous and
equation (28) de¯nes a pointwise continuous functional relationship between
v(w) and (µ;s(w);F(w)) for all w 2 [R;w(p)]:
The family T(F) is equicontinuous if every f 2 T(z) is uniformly continuous
on[R;w(p)] £ [R;p] and if the continuity is uniform for all functions T(z); i.e.,
if for every x 2 [R;w(p)] £[R;p] and "0 > 0 there exists a ±0 > 0 such that
jx ¡yj < ±0 implies jjf(x) ¡f(y)jj < "0; all f 2 T(z) (46)
where
jjf(x) ¡f(y)jj ´ maxhjv(x) ¡ v(y)j;js(x) ¡s(y)ji:
The following demonstration that this condition holds amounts to showing that





r +± + m(µ)s(w)[1 ¡ F(w)]
:





20where µ is de¯ned in equation (29). As a consequence,
jx ¡ yj < ±0 ) js(x) ¡s(y)j · max
w2[b;w]









where µ is the uniform upper bound on market tightness de¯ned in (29) given
that the search cost function is strictly convex.
Either v(p) equals the upper bound v or v(w) is an interior solution. In the
latter case,
c0
f(v(p)) = (1 ¡ ¯)(p ¡R)`(w(p))















Because s(w) and F(w) are both di®erentiable given any f = (s(w);v(p)) 2 z
by equations (2) and (23), so is `(w): Now in general, m(µ)=µ is monotone
increasing in µ and m(µ)=µ ! 1 as µ ! 0: If so, then a 1 > µ(p) > 0 exists
such that v(p) = v for all µ ·. µ(p): Hence,
jx ¡yj < ±0 ) jv(x) ¡ v(y)j · max
p2[R;p]








(1 ¡ ¯)[`(w(p)) +(p ¡w)¯`0(w(p))]
)
= "0
given that the cost of recruiting is strictly convex.
6.2 Wage Posting Case
Proof. In this case the wage rule w(p) is endogenous and satis¯es (31). Hence,
it is appropriate to think of z as a subset of the space of vector functions f(x) =

















[1 ¡ F(e w)]de w




These de¯nitions together with the market equations and steady state conditions
(23)-(25) de¯ne a map T : z ! z where z is the subspace of continuous
bounded real vector function with the sup norm and any ¯xed point of the map
is a non-trivial equilibrium under Assumptions 1 and 2. As z is non-empty,
compact and convex and T is continuous on z for the reasons given in the rent
sharing case, Schauder's theorem applies in this case as well if (46) holds for
this extended de¯nition of z:
In the rent sharing case, we used the fact that T(z) is in the set of di®er-
entiable functions given that F is a subset of the continuous bounded functions
to prove equicontinuity in the rent sharing case. To apply the same argument
in the wage posting case where w(p) is a component of any f 2 F we need to
show that w(p) is di®erentiable as well as v(p) and s(p): The added assumption
that the measure of employers with productivity less than or equal to p; call it
¹(p); is di®erentiable is needed for this purpose. Under this assumption, z can
be regarded as a subset of the di®erentiable functions de¯ned on [R;p]. Namely,
given any di®erentiable f(p) = (w(p);v(p);s(w(p)); it follows that the implied
F(w) is twice di®erentiable by equation (23). As a consequence, s(w) by equa-
tion (52) is also twice di®erentiable and so is `(w) by equation (48) given any
di®erentiable f(p). Hence, w(p) is di®erentiable by equation (50) so that
jx ¡yj < ±0 ) jw(x) ¡w(y)j · max
z2[R;:p]
















jx ¡ yj < ±0 ) jv(x) ¡v(y)j · max
z2[b;p]










Proof. In sum, we have shown that Tf satis¯ed (46) and consequently T : z !
z has a ¯xed point by Schauder's theorem in both the rent sharing and wage
22posting cases. The claim that any ¯xed point is non-trivial follows: Because as
constructed every f 2 z is such that s(w) ¸ s > 0 for all w ¸ b equation (22)
implies that µ = V=S < 1: But given that fact, equation (28) requires v(w) > 0
for all w > b and consequently µ = V=S > 0 given w > b: In short, the trivial
equilibrium that always exists is not a ¯xed point of the constructed map.
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